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Sacred Union or Radical Republic? The Dilemmas
of Wartime Propaganda in Portugal, 1916-1917
Filipe Ribeiro de Metieses
National University of Ireland, Maynooth
Participation in the European War that began in 1914 offered Portugal's
Republican leadership a unique opportunity to consolidate the regime that it had
unveiled in October 1910. The support of the whole nation might be harnessed
if a propaganda campaign managed to demonstrate clearly the need for unity in
the face of a common and mortal danger; if, in other words, the Portuguese were
led by the government to overcome their political, religious and economic
differences in order to act as one, and thus emerge triumphant from the conflict
(Teixeira 1996). Participation in the European conflict also offered up the
possibility of demonstrating in a practical form, intelligible to all, the strength
and virtue of the Republican creed: if all had to face the same wartime dangers,
serving in the ranks of the army wherever it may be sent, and to endure the same
sacrifices—rationing, military requisitions, taxes on war profits—then the virtues
of equality, a mainstay of Republican political discourse, would be made clear
to the whole country. In order to demand such sacrifices, the government would
have to explain the reasons for Portugal's participation in the conflict, and this
process would bring it closer to the 6 million Portuguese, the majority of whom
lay, because of restrictions on the franchise, outside the realm of politics.
Portugal might not be strong enough to tip the military balance in favour of the
Western Allies, but the young Republic could benefit enormously from active
participation, in so far as it would be able to rally the country's population for
the first time in its 6-year life, thereby neutralising the influence of its enemies
over the rural population. For this gamble to pay off, it was imperative that the
war be seen by the Portuguese as a national conflict, and not one desired by the
Republicans for partisan advantage: the primary task of war propaganda would
be to make sure that the desired interpretation of the motives for Portugal's
participation in the war became clear to all. The aim of this article is to describe
the propaganda campaign carried out in 1916 and 1917, demonstrating its
shortcomings, advancing some reasons for those shortcomings, and establishing
the link between the failure of the campaign and the overthrow of the Republican
government in December 1917.
All countries that participated in the First World War were aware of the
importance of propaganda as a tool to keep their respective civilian populations
willing to face, with confidence in a final victory, the doubts and sacrifices
typical of the wartime situation. The mass civilian armies which fought in the
trenches were cumbersome tools: educated and politicised, they needed to
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understand the reasons for their sacrifice, and the same could be said of the
civilians who participated in the war effort behind the lines. It took time,
however, for the propaganda machines of each country to develop. In fact, it has
become clear that in the first years of the conflict the belligerent governments,
concentrating all their energies on the military and economic aspects of the war,
played what was merely a secondary role in the internal propaganda battle,
leaving the brunt of the work to self-mobilising agencies—the press, patriotic
leagues, churches, unions, feminist and intellectual organisations, etc. It was
only around 1917 that, in the Allied countries, the respective governments began
to assume coordinating functions (Home 1997: 1-17). These conditions did not
apply to the Portuguese government, which was not fighting a total war: in 1916
the Portuguese army was defending Mozambique from German forces in
German East Africa, and the decision to send a Portuguese Expeditionary Corps
to the Western Front was made that year by the Allies, acting on a request from
the Portuguese government. Portugal was free to establish the scale of its
military participation in the war, unlike its Allies, for whom immediate survival
depended on sending every available man to the front. Moreover, the Republic
had not managed to forge a popular consensus of approval in its short existence:
entrusting wartime propaganda to forces outside the government might lead to
an undesired transformation of the contents of the propaganda message. All
wartime propaganda rested on an idealised vision of the post-war country.
Therefore, participation in the propaganda campaign by the Catholic Church or
the unions might lead to a different vision of a victorious Portugal being
promoted, a vision at odds with the Republicans' conception of their country's
future. In other words, if Portugal was at war so that the Republic could
consolidate itself, then wartime propaganda had to remain in the hands of trusted
Republicans. Accordingly, the help of non-Republican self-mobilising groups
was never sought. This was reflected even at the political level, where the
so-called Sacred Union government was in fact a coalition composed of two of
the three Republican parties, with no Socialist, Catholic or monarchist represen-
tation (the first Sacred Union government, led by Antonio José de Almeida,
lasted from March 1916 to April 1917; the second Sacred Union government,
made up solely of Democratic party members, and headed this time by party
leader Afonso Costa, lasted until December 1917). The political model adopted
in 1910—that of a radical, vanguard-led Republic, was not to be abandoned.
What was more surprising, in the light of this situation, was the lack of
commitment shown by the government to the propaganda campaign, so essential
for the turning of military intervention into a national policy understood and
accepted by all. The government passed its responsibilities on to a host of
friendly individuals and organisations which, although well-meaning, simply did
not have the resources and the capability to mobilise a whole country facing the
threat of the German Empire.
The government's meagre participation in the propaganda campaign is one of
the most problematic aspects of Portugal's wartime experience. The Sacred
Union governments showed a complete disdain for many of the institutions at
their disposal, thereby weakening their ability to reach the population directly.
This was true, for example, of primary and secondary schools, which in other
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countries, especially France, so often the model state to be copied by Portugal's
Republicans, provided the government with a ready-made network for the
dissemination of propaganda.1 The few government initiatives on the propaganda
front were characterised by a disastrous and almost incomprehensible lack of
commitment for a group of men who held the days of anti-monarchist propa-
ganda as a mythical golden age of unity of purpose. In 1916, the Premier,
Antonio José de Almeida, carried out a poorly organised succession of quick
visits around the country (Noticias d'Évora, 27.4.1916, Gazeta de Coimbra,
4.10.1916). A series of rallies to be held at national monuments was limited to
the first of its kind, at the monastery of Batalha. A second series of rallies
scheduled for 1917 involving the whole government, each member covering his
respective base of political support, was postponed until the spring and then
abandoned after the collapse of the first Sacred Union government in April of
that year (O Mundo, 31.3.1917). Another failed initiative was the launch in 1917
of a magazine, Portugal na Guerra, which was to be published in Paris in
Portuguese. Thanks to this magazine's monopoly on photographs of the Por-
tuguese troops at the front, Portuguese newspapers and magazines were unneces-
sarily antagonised, as they could not provide their readers with photographs of
the Portuguese trenches and the Portuguese troops in action. Needless to say, the
magazine never found a market and was kept alive only by substantial govern-
ment subsidies. Only four issues were published, and even their contents were
the subject of constant attack in the Lisbon press, which accused Portugal na
Guerra of concentrating on the Allied, rather than the Portuguese, war effort.2
Belated attempts to launch another publication and to create a national propa-
ganda commission were to be overturned by the Sidónio Pais coup of December
1917 (A Capital, 5.8.1917, 11.8.1917).
The lack of government initiatives on the propaganda front leads to the
conclusion that the Sacred Union governments did not perceive its value, not
only as a way of turning the country's military effort into a popular cause, but
also as a way of shoring up the Republican regime in Portugal. The most
important example of how the state's resources were badly used was the lack of
policy in relation to schools, which represented a potentially unsurpassable
network of centres for the spreading of propaganda. The loyalty of primary and
secondary school teachers to the Republic was not assured across the country,
but education in general had always been described as one of the priorities of the
Republican leadership, who viewed it not only in the context of developing the
country's economic potential but also as a means of creating loyal citizens:
literacy, after all, was vital for participation in the country's political life. Some
politically active primary school teachers offered their support to the cause from
the earliest days of Portugal's intervention; they underlined their potentially key
role in helping to carry out a campaign of propaganda and national reconciliation
(Educaçâo Nacional, 19.3.1916). Despite this appeal, the government chose to
ignore the 6,000 schools it controlled across the country, and to let the teachers'
patriotic ardour cool down and be replaced by the more immediate difficulties
of survival on a low income in a country racked by inflation. Not even in Italy,
where little was done on the propaganda front until the defeat of Caporetto, was
there such a disdain for domestic propaganda and for the use of schools.
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According to Andrea Fava, the Italian Ministry of Education, even if it did not
send out precise instructions on propaganda to the schools, at least encouraged
the national school teachers to participate in works of "civilian assistance" (Fava
1997: 53-69). This lack of government initiative was so inexplicable that even
O Mundo, fiercely loyal to the dominant Democratic party, broke ranks within
the Sacred Union and questioned the wisdom of the government's inaction.
Partisan use was made by O Mundo of the situation, because the Education
Minister belonged to the Evolutionist party and was therefore, in O Mundo'?,
eyes, a legitimate target. Lopes de Oliveira, a teacher in the Passos Manuel
secondary school in Lisbon, sent O Mundo a copy of a letter which he had also
sent to the school's headmaster, complaining that, having read out to his classes
the official explanation for Portugal's belligerence, as published in the official
gazette, the Diario do Governo, he had come to the conclusion that the majority
of his students were completely unaware that such justification existed. This,
Lopes de Oliveira added, at a time when the secondary schools were the main
centres of pro-German propaganda along with the barracks (O Mundo,
21.1.1917). According to the irate teacher, the Ministry for Public Instruction
seemed to think that Portugal was a neutral country, ignoring as it did the
repeated requests by school teachers for a national campaign to make students—
and through them their parents—aware of the reasons why an army was being
sent to France.3
One possible explanation for the failure to use the school system for the
purposes of propaganda was that hopes had been placed in Preparatory Military
Instruction (IMP) to carry out the same task. The IMP played an important part
in the Republican concept of national defence, which revolved around the notion
of a nation at arms: it was designed to bring boys from the age of seven upwards
into contact with military discipline, physical exercise and the carrying and use
of weapons, as well as to inculcate patriotic values. From April 1916 onwards,
a series of decrees attempted to reinforce and widen the IMP's network at
national level. Its military component was to be reinforced for all those over the
age of seventeen, while in the Civic Education classes Portugal's participation in
the war was to be discussed.4 Subsequent legislation attempted to stimulate the
creation of IMP societies, which were given the official status of "patriotic and
laudable", and staffed with two officers from each recruitment area for the
training of its members. Henceforth, greater discipline would be the norm: five
unexcused absences could lead to seven days in prison {Ordens do Exército,
1916). These measures show that the governments were, at least, aware of the
need to expose future soldiers to war propaganda; nevertheless, the lack of
resources and the shortage of officers meant that the dream of a national IMP
network remained just that. Worse still, attendance at the existing societies was
so low that in September 1916 the Ministry of the Interior sent a circular letter
to all Civil Governors reminding them to exert pressure on local authorities to
co-operate with the IMP's leadership.5
There is no doubt that the quantity of propaganda required to lead Portugal
into war was underestimated, and that the propaganda actually produced was not
tailored adequately to Portugal, for its ideas and language were borrowed almost
exclusively from French propaganda. The official explanation for the sending
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of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps (CEP) to France, published in the Diario
do Governo in 17.1.1917, described a clear diplomatic position on Portugal's
part from the moment that the European War had begun, which had never been
one of simple neutrality; an aggressive and treacherous policy on the part of
Germany; and a fully legal seizure of German merchant ships interned in
Portuguese harbours, resulting first in an insulting German ultimatum and then
a declaration of war. This was a reductionist document: years of intense political
debate about Portugal's possible intervention in the conflict were ignored. The
report stated that "The country—the whole world—knows what our attitude has
been and knows the events which shaped it. The Portuguese Government hid
nothing from the nation which it represents; it hid nothing from friend or foe
alike, and as a result has nothing new to add" (Diario do Governo, 17.1.1917).
This attitude of unquestionable openness was a sham, readily contrasted with the
words of an opposition member in the July 1917 secret sessions of parliament:
according to Moura Pinto, a Unionist deputy, Portugal's intervention in the war
"provoked one of the greatest confusions registered in our national history and
was the sole source of hatreds which will never be extinguished among the
present generation" (Assembleia da República 1917: 9). As to the benefits that
the war would bring Portugal, the declaration stated that it was in general too
early to tell, but one benefit was already clear: the affirmation of "a people
worthy of the traditions of its past and the hopes for its future, worthy of its
freedom and its independence, worthy of the noble civilisation to which it
belongs and in which law and justice are sacred and inviolable notions" (Diario
do Governo, 17.1.1917).
For Portugal, belligerence was to be a feat of glory never to be forgotten by
the rest of the world: a sacrifice endured for an alliance six centuries old, with
no desire for conquest or material rewards. It was, moreover, a fight for the
rights of small nations, which the German empire was crushing. "Portugal
defends its life and defends its patrimony. For these it will shed its blood to the
last drop" (Diario do Governo, 17.1.1917). This struggle was being carried out
by a nation finding its long-lost strength. At the rally at the Batalha monastery
Afonso Costa used belligerence and the international prestige it brought the
country to accuse his enemies of unworthiness and cowardice.6 The Universi-
dade Livre (an organisation designed to promote adult education) distributed a
special pamphlet to the departing troops, in which President Bernardino
Machado explained his conception of the conflict. The war, he argued, was the
logical continuation of the revolution that had given birth to the Republic: it was
supported by the people at home and there were strong ties between domestic
reactionaries and Germany: the people's enemies in 1910 and those of 1916
were essentially the same. In an army whose officer corps was still largely
monarchist, such words cannot have been well received. According to
Bernardino Machado, moreover, the history of Portugal represented a long road
towards democracy, running from the establishment of municipalities, to the
Estates-general, to the liberal constitution of 1821 and, of course, to the
Republic. The war was the culmination of this process:
It is our mission to struggle always in the vanguard of civilisation, that same civilisation
which we were the first to take to the whole world through seas never before sailed.
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This civilisation is called, today, democracy. It is the motto which is inscribed [...] on
the flag which we have entrusted to our brave army. Fighting for democracy we are
fighting for ourselves, for our kind, for our language, for our past and for our future
(Universidade Livre 1917: 5-6).
This vision of the war would undoubtedly find support among Republicans,
whose patriotism had been forged by the British ultimatum of 1890, and who
could not conceive of it in a different form. Bernardino Machado's words
proved, however, that the Republic's President was deeply alienated from the
reality of his country. Demonstrations in Lisbon and Oporto in favour of the
Allies did not reflect the state of mind of the whole population before the threat
of war; the law of Separation of Church and State had not diminished the
prestige of the Church among Portugal's Catholics; finally, the replacement of a
network of monarchist caciques by its Republican equivalent had not turned the
country into a working democracy. References to Portugal's glorious past and
the regime as a paladin of democracy and civilisation were not going to attract
the support of the rural population, whose material difficulties were being
ignored by Lisbon in its rush to prepare an army for the Western Front. The
repeated affirmation of the population's supposed patriotism and willingness to
sacrifice itself for the Fatherland and for the Republic reveals how shallow the
regime's understanding of public opinion really was: a more careful reflection
would have made it clear that Civilisation, Democracy and the Rights of Small
Nations were hardly the causes for which the Portuguese as a whole would
readily fight; something else was needed to transform the country's participation
in the conflict into a true and meaningful national war.
Eric Hobsbawm, describing the production of tradition in the Third Republic,
makes the point that "history before 1789 (except, perhaps, for 'nos ancêtres les
Gaulois') recalled church and monarchy" (Hobsbawm 1983: 272-3) and that it
was therefore neglected by the Republican leadership. Even within the context
of the French Revolution, however, there was an infinity of dates and men to
celebrate in accordance with the political nuances of the Third Republic. For the
Republicans in Portugal, attempting to mobilise the country for war, the situation
was far grimmer. The Republic was less than six years old when Portugal went
to war; there was no reservoir of Republican events and symbols to draw upon
in the attempt to generate popular enthusiasm. There was, moreover, a very real
shortage of popular heroes who might be disassociated from a royal or a
religious setting. Bernardino Machado's piece for the Universidade Livre book-
let vividly illustrates this difficulty. Autonomy for the municipalities, one of the
pillars of the Republican creed in Portugal, was also defended by the Integralists,
eager to recreate the power structures of the pre-absolutist monarchy; the liberals
of 1820 were not democrats, and popular engagement in the civil wars of the
early 19th century often occurred on the absolutist and clerical side. The vision
of Portuguese history presented to the departing troops by Bernardino Machado
was therefore fraught with contradictions and its propaganda value was, at best,
slight.
The government's paralysis on the propaganda front did not mean that the
importance of propaganda was not recognised by other bodies. A discussion of
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the various private attempts to mobilise the country is necessary, because many
organisations took up the challenge of spreading the message of the Sacred
Union in order to prepare the country for the coming struggle. The most
important of these organisations was, not surprisingly, the Democratic party, the
largest and best organised political force in Portugal. Its network of local
branches, political clubs and newspapers was unrivalled. On 1.4.1916 O Mundo,
the most important of the party's newspapers, published the Democratic party's
call to arms which had been, in the newspaper's own words, "profusely
distributed to the people and especially to the party's political organisations".
The party called upon all its political commissions, centres, associations, etc. to
"enlighten the people as to the causes and origins of our participation in the war,
through conferences and propaganda missions". According to the document,
Portugal was at war in order to carry out its duty towards England, an ancient
ally. Failure to do so would have earned it "the entire world's scorn". The
Portuguese army was fighting for the rights of nationalities to exist, for the
"triumph of Law and Civilisation, (and) against the barbarian empires' brutal
theories of universal domination." Finally, this message had to be taken into all
villages, no matter how remote, "so as to prepare all Portuguese to perform any
sacrifice which the Fatherland may request". The first months of the war saw a
flurry of these party activities, notably in the larger cities, where patriotic rallies
took place one after the other. On 4.4.1916, for example, four rallies took place
in Lisbon alone, with one speaker, Jaime Cortesâo, appearing at two different
venues. These rallies would continue throughout 1916 and 1917, although their
frequency naturally decreased. In the greater part of the country, however, the
Democratic party's activity was much less intense, and in some areas it barely
existed. As early as September 1916, the Democratic newspaper Corresponden-
cia da Covilhä complained bitterly of how little the city's Democrats had done
on the propaganda front.7
Occasionally overlapping the Democratic machine, although keeping up a
front of independence, were a variety of organisations which appeared in 1916
with the explicit purpose of aiding the government in the task of preparing the
country's population for wartime and, in some cases, the post-war world. The
most important of these organisations were the Cruzada das Mulheres Portugue-
sas, the Junta Patriótica do Norte, and the Junta Nacional de Propaganda
Patriótica. The latter was virtually indistinguishable from the party; its mani-
festo, for example, had been drafted by one of O Mundo's leading journalists,
Mayer Garçâo. Published on 9.6.1916, the manifesto argued that while Portugal
had in no way contributed to the outbreak of the war, it could not avoid
participating in it, because of the British alliance and Portugal's own higher
interests.8 The Junta's limited actions can be clearly seen in an interview granted
by Abflio Marçal, one of its members, to O Mundo, on 11.10.1916. Marçal
described his associates as "good Republicans, friends of the country and the
regime" and their actions as a "criss-crossing of the entire country, explaining to
the humble and simple people of the countryside the reason for our belligerence,
and the material and moral benefits which will result from that belligerence".
Somewhat naively, Marçal believed that, after only four months of this cam-
paign, the country had been won over and that the time had come to change over
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from war propaganda to preparing the people for reaping the benefits of
victory.9 In order to develop Portugal's backward economy, the model to follow
was now Spain. Abilio Marçal's claim that the Junta had reached the whole of
the population must be greeted with scepticism, for the government was to
receive urgent appeals, throughout 1916 and 1917, for a continuing national
propaganda campaign. Moreover, his claims that the Junta's propaganda had
been delivered to even the most obscure of villages, and that it had been properly
understood, do not ring true. Joäo Ferreira do Amaral, an officer who served in
both Africa and the Western Front during the war, provided a completely
different picture of how wartime propaganda was viewed by its intended
audience.10
In the north of the country, a more serious effort at a prolonged mobilisation
campaign was made, one which involved local authorities, delegates from "the
various scientific, industrial, commercial, artistic and associative corporations",
and "all individuals who, spontaneously or at the League's invitation, agree with
its patriotic goal" (Junta Patriótica do Norte 1918: vii). The League in question
was the Junta Patriótica do Norte (or the North Portugal Patriotic League, as
it styled itself in English in its material), an attempt to co-ordinate the action of
local Republican authorities and the private sector in the preparation of the
country for war. According to the two summaries of the League's activities,
published in 1918 and 1931, such activities were divided into two periods:
before and after the departure of the CEP for France. The first period was
marked by "the diffusion of patriotic ideas" (Junta Patriótica do Norte 1918:
xviii) carried out in the manner typical of the First World War: "When this
movement was at its highest, manifestos and bills were published and widely
distributed throughout the country; exhibitions were promoted in picture theatre,
lectures and public meetings were held..." (Junta Patriótica do Norte 1918:
xviii-xix). Twelve manifestos were published in 1916, five in 1917, and two in
1918, by which time, of course, the focus of the League had changed. Its main
task was now the funding and running of the "Home for Soldiers' Children",
whose mission it was to educate both the children of poor soldiers and those
orphaned by the war. By 1918, eighty-five children were being looked after.
Other initiatives of the League were its "Information Office", designed to
facilitate the contact between soldiers at the front and their respective families,
a service for the forwarding of newspapers to the Western Front, the organisation
of marches in support of the Allied cause, and a service of aid to Portuguese
POWs in German hands. Finally, the League organised art exhibitions and other
fund-raising activities, which were extended to expatriate communities in Brazil
and California. The League's rhetoric, as exemplified by a one-page pamphlet
whose distribution to the troops was authorised by the Ministry of War in
September 1917, was built upon the idea of the need for solidarity at home in
order to give those at the front the peace of mind necessary for the proper
performance of their patriotic duty. The pamphlet spoke of the pride which
praise for Portugal's troops, emanating from Allied officers and the Allied press,
gave rise to back in the country, and promised the soldiers that their heroism at
the front would be matched at home by the care afforded to their families during
and after the war. The "Home For Soldiers' Children" represented living proof
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of this promise "at the moment when you have been called upon to risk your life
for the destiny of the Fatherland, closely bound as it is with the destiny of
Humanity" (Junta Patriótica do Norte 1917).
The Junta Patriótica do Norte stands out from the rest of the self-mobilisation
effort for its ambition, linking local authorities, private entities and patriotic
citizens in the attempt to show the soldiers departing for the front that the
country was united behind their sacrifice. It also stands as a powerful reminder
of what might have been achieved had the Lisbon government not ignored the
vital propaganda battle that had to be waged aggressively across the country so
that the Republic could emerge stronger from the ordeal of war. Nevertheless,
it made the same mistakes as other mobilising agencies: it considered the
propaganda battle to be finished once the CEP had departed for France, it used
an imported rhetoric which meant little to the majority of the soldiers and
civilian population, and it was unable to sustain the enthusiasm of its members
for a drawn-out campaign. According to the League's 1918 report, its attempts
to branch out into rural areas were a failure and the number of rallies planned
but never carried out (22) far outweighed the number which actually went
ahead.11
The last of the three organisations already mentioned, the Cruzada das
Mulheres Portuguesas, was torn between two roles: that of a semi-official
charitable association, and that of a pioneering institution campaigning for
women's rights, which tried to involve women in the war effort so that they
could demonstrate their importance to a Republican leadership which, despite its
rhetoric, had failed to move towards equality of the sexes since 1910. The
Cruzada was under the intellectual guidance of Ana de Castro Osório, a leading
pre-war feminist, who wasted no time in seizing Portugal's belligerent status as
a shortcut to economic, social, and political equality for women in Portugal.
Osório's language regarding the war was identical to that of the government;
through the war, Portugal's women would rediscover their glorious past and true
identity. Faced by the war, the Portuguese woman could undergo a process of
rediscovery: "She is called to the responsibilities of the present hour, reminded
of what she was once, in the past, names which she was never made to learn and
memorise are mentioned and she, surprised and hurt, asks 'what is my name?
What is my name? I can no longer remember it... I have lost my name in the
darkness'" (Osório 1916: 5). Through the present conflict, if the government
were to allow women to participate in the war effort, that name would be
rediscovered: Portuguese women would realise that they were the heiresses of a
long tradition of heroic women who had stood by their men, even in battle, for
centuries. This participation in the war effort was volunteered by the Cruzada,
which raised money for the families of mobilised soldiers, distributed clothes,
cigarettes and pre-addressed postcards (vital in an essentially illiterate army)
among the departing soldiers, set up a nursing course; all this in addition to the
propaganda sessions, where the war was explained to a female audience, never
deviating from the government's own view of events, and in which advice was
given on how to influence the departing soldiers: "As mothers, as wives, as
sisters, as friends, we must influence their hearts and their minds, breathing into
them courage, abnegation, and patriotism. And when the time for them to leave
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comes, and though our hearts may be bleeding, we must not let ourselves cry ..."
(Pinheiro 1916: 20).
Ana de Castro Osório, despite the difficulties faced by the Cruzada before and
after the collapse of Portugal's war effort in December 1917, towered over her
contemporaries in terms of the energy devoted to the task of mobilising Portugal
for the war. Her action was, however, dispersed over too wide an area: she
became involved in the struggle to prepare the whole country for the war, the
struggle to prepare women to replace their husbands and brothers in the
workplace with a view to keeping the economy alive, to prepare women for full
citizenship, and to combat those engaged in counter-propaganda against the war
effort. She criticised the Church's insistence on the need for peace, rather than
for victory (Osório 1918: 114), and recognised the war as an opportunity to
create a new generation of committed Republicans—the children still at
school—whose spirit would be forever altered by the political agitation and
changes brought about by the conflict. In order to take advantage of this unique
opportunity she wrote De Como Portugal Foi Chamado à Guerra: Historia para
Crianças, published in 1918. Despite her constant efforts, and her undoubted
usefulness to the Republic, she was ignored by the Sacred Union governments,
and began to complain of a vicious circle in operation: women were slow to
adhere to the war effort, while the government was slow to call for their help.
Osório found it difficult to accept such an attitude on the part of the government:
it refused to create training schools so that women could replace the departing
soldiers in their professions, to ensure the equality of wages among men and
women, and even to allow women working for the state to attend the Cruzada
nursing course (Osório 1918: 111). This, she claimed, was a backward stance,
not in tune with the age. The United States, Osório pointed out, did not hesitate
to send its men to Europe and at the same time increase industrial output; this
was possible because Americans knew that "behind their men [...] they have
women who are capable of working, masters of factory and field, beings full of
energy, nobility, and strength".12
Other forces and individuals joined the propaganda battle, notably in intellec-
tual circles, where the link with France was strongest, and where the defence of
the Republic was seen as vital. The review Águia, directed by the poet Teixeira
de Pascoais, engaged in denunciations of Germany from the onset of the war,
and dedicated its April 1916 issue exclusively to war propaganda; after that
issue, however, the war disappeared from its pages. According to Pascoais, the
European War was merely the latest round in the conflict between two civilisa-
tions that fought for the soul of Europe: the Celtic-Roman civilisation, which
stood for beauty, justice, and law for all, and the German civilisation, hostile to
those around it. Participation in this war would heal rifts within Portugal and
allow the country to find its real strength, doing away with
this cold selfishness which renders individual life incompatible with collective life, this
disbelief in our own qualities; this inertia which consumes all of our energy; this stupid,
aggressive, fratricidal, and destructive fanaticism [...] the lack of a common goal,
which results from having forgotten out traditions, our history, our art, our literature,
in other words, our patriotic soul. (A Águia 1914, 166)
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For Teixeira de Pascoais, moreover, the role of Art in the conflict was to present
the ideals behind the war in such a way as to overcome internal divisions and
fire the imagination of the country's youth. His poetic efforts to this end included
"Belgium", published in June 1915, and "Miss Cavell", which followed in
December. In the April 1916 issue, Teixeira de Pascoais turned to Portugal's ties
with France: "As Portuguese we must love France, no matter what, for France
is our older sister; as Latins we must love France no matter what, for France is
the great fountain of the Latin spirit; as men we must love France no matter
what, for she was our emancipator, for she gave us freedom, self-esteem, justice,
law, and individual consciousness" (A Águia 1916: 121).
Closely linked to A Águia, was Jaime Cortesäo, a Democratic party deputy
and the man who best understood the structural difficulties that propaganda faced
in a country like Portugal. Doctor, playwright, poet, politician and historian, he
was acutely aware that the oratory of his fellow politicians and artists was lost
on the great mass of the population, who lacked even the most basic understand-
ing of the key concepts in wartime propaganda: nation, fatherland, international
law, the alliance with Great Britain. There was no point in appealing to the
patriotism of those who did not know they had a Patria. Cortesäo understood,
however, that the war was an excellent opportunity to change this situation,
turning the apathetic rural population into a legion of committed Republicans.
Cortesäo's great contribution to the propaganda campaign was his Cartilha do
Povo. The primer consisted of a simple dialogue (The People's Primer) between
José Povinho, the traditional embodiment of the Portuguese, his son, Manuel
Soldado, and a patrician figure, Joäo Portugal. Through the dialogue Cortesäo
makes clear his belief in the innate patriotism and worth of the Portuguese,
which had been obscured by the years of supposed decadence in the twilight of
the monarchy. Joäo Portugal patiently teaches José Povinho what a Fatherland
is,13 and outlines the efforts made by generations of Portuguese to keep their
country independent. Joäo Portugal then leads his audience of two through the
intricacies of Portugal's entry into the war, appealing to their honour with an
everyday example: if a neighbour's house was on fire, would one wait until it
threatened one's own house before offering to help put it out? The fire, of
course, was the German army, which would do to the men of Portugal what it
had done to the men of Belgium and of Serbia: "Their fields and farms were
ruined, their houses, universities and churches were destroyed, their wives and
daughters were dishonoured, men and women of all ages were shot, and those
who were spared face the harshest tasks and the most onerous tributes"
(Cortesäo 1916: 13-14). Convinced by such plain but powerful arguments,
Manuel Soldado becomes impatient to depart for the front, while his father
laments not being able to accompany him. The Cartilha was an important first
step in the right direction, but it was not followed up: Cortesäo himself went to
the front, while his work was never used as the basis of a national campaign,
with national schools, drama groups, etc. Other intellectual figures who gave
their weight to the propaganda campaign were the poets Guerra Junqueiro and
Augusto Casimiro, and the Grand Master of the Masonic Order, and onetime
Minister of Education, Sebastiäo de Magalhäes Lima.14
Despite the distance that separates Portugal from France, and despite the
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influence that conservative and anti-Republican elements held over Portuguese
society, the governments of Antonio José de Almeida and later of Afonso Costa
opted for a secondary role in the wartime propaganda campaign. Indeed, Antonio
José de Almeida stated famously in parliament that it was precisely because of
this distance between Portugal and the Western Front that war propaganda
was not necessary in Portugal (Diario da Cámara das Deputados, 20.5.1916).
This stance was maintained despite a barrage of appeals for firmer action, which
arrived from different sources, and all of which were ignored. In May 1916
Jaime Cortesäo began to warn the government of the dangers of inaction:
I have not yet seen the government carrying out propaganda concerning our military
duties. It could be said that your Excellency (Antonio José de Almeida) is convinced
that a single word, a sort of divine fiat, will suffice to lead armies to war. If we convince
ourselves that our people are ready to endure all sacrifices for their fatherland, then we
are living a lie" (Diario da Cámara dos Deputados, 20.5.1917).
Magalhäes Lima was to reiterate this warning over a year later. In an interview
to O Mundo, he stated that "above all it is necessary to impose on propaganda
the unity of thought and action which it has lacked until today, because dispersed
propaganda, of the type that has been circulated, yields few results, and can even
be counter-productive" (0 Mundo, 10.8.1917). Two weeks later a report from a
Ministry of War Information Service (MGSI) agent stated that "In the whole of
the Minho Province—propaganda against the Republic and above all against the
present government is most intense. It is indispensable to disseminate a strong
counter-propaganda" (Arquivo Histórico Militar 1917). The intensely pro-war
journalist Hörnern Cristo, writing in his newspaper O de Aveiro, days before the
coup that toppled Afonso Costa, complained that
the government has completely given up on propaganda. There has been no propaganda
in the press, no propaganda from the tribune, no propaganda in schools, no propaganda
in the barracks. All that was left to the traitors and the germanophiles. They were the
ones who spread a most active propaganda. A formidable propaganda. In the press, in
the streets, in schools, in halls, in public meetings, by all means, using all resources.
Who opposed them? No one, absolutely no one. Except O de Aveiro... (O de Aveiro,
25.11.1917)
This lack of enthusiasm for the propaganda battle was only admitted by the
defeated Republican leadership as it left for exile in December 1917. Deposed
President Bernardino Machado told a French diplomat in Madrid that "the
Government, faithful to the English alliance, thought that it was fulfilling its duty
by carrying out its (military) campaign in France, but it failed to find popular
support through the press, rallies, or conferences. The people lost interest in the
government" (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères 1917).
This refusal on the part of the government to engage in propaganda activity
must be carefully interpreted. It raises serious questions about the nature of the
Republican regime idealised by the men of 1910. Might the refusal to involve
the population in the war effort have been born out of the fear of that same
population, the majority of which was rural and conservative? Could the
Democrats have maintained their stranglehold on the country's political life if an
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agreement had been made between the Republic and the country, with the
promise of significant political and even social reforms as the reward for an
orderly participation in the war? These questions undoubtedly haunted many
within the Democratic party, who recognised the hollowness of the Sacred Union
as it existed in Portugal. Jaime Cortesäo, in his wartime diary, wrote of conflict
within the party, especially prevalent among the deputies fighting in France: "in
order to form a national government we defended the entry into the government
not only of the Republican parties, but also of the working classes, while I went
so far as to defend the inclusion of a Catholic, of those who claimed to be neutral
in political matters" (Cortesäo 1919: 51). Deputies returning from the front for
the opening of parliament, despite their membership of the Democratic party,
wanted to correct the organisational errors of the CEP and to topple the
government.15 In other words, those at the front, who were closest to the fighting
and the war effort in general, saw the continuation of that war effort as being
more important than the Democrats' survival in power: their awareness of the
national interest was raised by being at the front, as was their understanding of
the war's unpopularity with the troops and hence with the country as a whole.
Greater participation in the Sacred Union by opposing political forces, a political
truce that would reach into the heart of the countryside, the bringing of the
Church and the unions into the war effort: all these steps had to be taken for the
war effort to survive, and yet they had a price. The Republic could not continue
to be a radical regime, led by a small vanguard of ardent and anti-clerical
francophiles, weaned politically on a violent opposition to a monarchy whose
supporters they identified as traitors—with whom there could be no compro-
mise—but who were simply too strong to be removed from the national
equation. A recognition of the Church's importance was highly necessary,
although this would require a reform of the law of separation; co-operation with
the National Workers' Union (UON) would have improved the morale in the
large cities, where the Republicans' lack of a social programme had been taking
a toll on their popularity since the 1912 strikes. All of these options were open
to the Republicans: none was taken. This left the Sacred Union governments
with more and more enemies as the economic situation deteriorated, and as
material concerns overrode all considerations about the war and the fate of
Portugal's soldiers in France. The end, when it came, was swift. Sidónio Pais
launched his coup in Lisbon with the support of 250 soldiers earmarked for
immediate departure for France, and the government had nearly no forces with
which to defend itself (Meneses 1996).
Portugal's war effort lasted less than two years before it fell apart. The
propaganda that was supposed to inform the Portuguese people as to why they
were being called upon to sacrifice themselves in France and in Africa was
inadequate in quantity, content and quality. Posters and the cinema were ignored,
and in a country where the illiteracy rate stood at 70% the influence of an
essentially literary propaganda was always to prove limited. Even a pioneering
work such as Jaime Cortesäo's Cartilha required a support structure to make its
message, suitable for the whole population, reach its target audience. Speeches
and rallies were essentially limited to the larger cities and towns, and their
audiences were made up of Republicans; the language of these speeches and
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gatherings was designed to rally the Republican faithful, asking them to make a
supreme effort to control and guide the rest of the country, even if unwillingly,
towards active participation in the war. Monarchist, Catholic and syndicalist
opinions were ignored. The lack of dialogue between rival political forces in
Portugal was astounding. It was expected that once the troops had arrived in
France, fear for their fate would keep the country united; this was not to be the
case. The Republican leadership thought its support to be sufficiently strong to
keep the regime intact during the war years: but the counter-mobilisation on the
part of the Right and the syndicalist Left, and their eventual union in support of
Sidónio Pais' bid for power, tipped the scales against the war effort. The war had
provided the Sacred Union governments with the means to form a nation of 6
million Portuguese united by a common effort: but by focusing their attention on
Republican opinion alone, in order to keep alive the dream of a radical Republic,
wartime governments saw all their hopes dashed by the natural reaction of a
scorned but ultimately powerful opposition. This opposition was to claim to
represent the majority of the country, and that it was implementing a national
policy against what it described as a small and unrepresentative clique, which
had clung to power since 1910 with disastrous results. It was this message, and
not the government's version of events, which was to reach and convince the
majority of the country's population.16
Notes
1
 See Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau (1993).
2
 O Século, the main Lisbon daily, was one of the most vociferous opponents of Portugal na Guerra, which
deprived both itself and its sister publication, Illustraçāo Portugueza, of photographs from the front: "We
see, through the appearance of the second issue of Mr. Pina's magazine, that the government has decided
to ignore the public and press protests against the scandalous monopoly on photographs conceded to that
same magazine. The Portuguese army [...] has at the front a photographic service, paid for by the State [...]
However, unlike other armies, it is not able to profit from that service, because the propaganda of our
military effort is rendered useless by an immoral favouritism, which prevents the war photos from receiving
all the publicity they deserve [...]" (O Sécalo, 12.7.1917). See also the same newspaper, 12.10.1917 &
6.11.1917 for further attacks by O Sécuto against Portugal na Guerra.
3
 O Mundo returned to this theme on 27.1.1917: "The Minister for Public Instruction has not ordered, to this
day, the reading out in schools of the Government's Report on our participation in the war. He has not
ordered it, nor will he do so in the future. This is what we heard a monarchist say. O Mundo regrets what
is happening, and regrets that monarchists should feel themselves entitled to make declarations in the
Republic's name or to make predictions ...that everything tells us, unfortunately, will be correct. We do
not want to fight the Minister. We avoid all that might bring disunity, and it does not seem right to us that
supporters of the Sacred Union such as ourselves should attack its ministers, diminishing its prestige. But
the Minister's attitude remains ... inexplicable. The enemies of the regime have long considered it a
capitulation. Dr Pedro Martins surely does not want it said that, because he has encountered in some schools
resistance to war propaganda, he will attempt nothing against the germanophilism of certain sectors with
which he has kept up relations. But these arc personal relations, and must not be—surely are not—political
relations. Let Dr. Pedro Martins reflect. Were history to be written on the basis of the archives of our
Ministry of Instruction, historians would not even be aware that there had been a European war in the first
quarter of the 20th century."
4
 Ordens do Exército, 1916, 3.4.1916, Instrução Militar Preparatória, Secretaria de Guerra, la Direcção Gerai:
"[...] Article 7: To attempt to organize Preparatory Military Instruction corps in schools and sporting
clubs, in order to harmonize the diffusion of that instruction with the comfort of the population
[...] In this way the physical strengthening [of the Portuguese] will be achieved, and patriotism will be
inflamed, placing the Portuguese in the most suitable condition for national defence, for the Republican
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spirit, and for the integrity of our Fatherland, which, brought by an ambitious nation into the conflict that
involved Europe and possibly the whole world, because of a mad lust for power completely incompatible
with the intellectual achievements and social conditions of our age, will emerge from that conflict nobler,
stronger, and prouder, reacquiring the leading role in the concert of nations, which rightly belongs to it as
the discoverer of the greater part of the world."
5
 "This Directory-General having been made aware of successive absences by the young men assigned to IMP
in many of the sites of instruction based in municipal capitals, which means that we are headed for the
scheme's complete abandonment—so pernicious for an important service is that of the preparation for
military duty of our youth [...]" (Arquivo Nacional, Lisboa, Ministério do Interior 1916).
6
 (O Mundo, 25.8.1916). This declaration and others like it led the opposition press's keeping a close watch
on what, if anything, foreign governments and the foreign press said about Portugal, humiliating the Sacred
Union government every time Portugal's war effort was ignored. See, for example, O Dia (Lisbon),
18.4.1917: "We have with us French and Spanish newspapers and in both we sought out the text of the
English (sic) Prime Minister's text, still hoping that Havas had cut short the cable containing Lloyd
George's speech in praise of the armies fighting alongside the English. Unfortunately Havas had not made
a mistake. All are mentioned, even the Belgians.
Lloyd George did not even make the simplest of references in respect of Portugal! It is hard to accept,
but that's the way it is ..."
7
 "We feel infinitely embittered. Everywhere 'kermesses', festivals, and shows were held which obtained
sizable contributions for the poor families of those good Portuguese soldiers, for the medical care of our
wounded, for the winter clothing of the keepers of our honour in Flanders.
What did we do? We have three clubs, with rooms which are sufficiently large to hold an event that
would not shame us: a patriotic rally, a raffle, a concert...
The war? Everybody shrugs their shoulders: Why bother? No one is being sent" (Correspondência da
Covilhã, 17.9.1916).
8
 "Here is the war! We did not provoke it. It sought us out, as it did other peoples. We know what we are
going to fight for. For the honour of our Fatherlands, for the salvation of national independence, for the
triumph of liberty. We will fight to avenge the dead who fell defending our flag; we will fight to ensure
the future of our children" (Junta Nacional de Propaganda Patriótica 1916).
9
 "The people, by being present at our meetings and at our great patriotic rallies, listening closely and warmly,
applauding our vibrant speeches, show that they understand what we are saying to them. At this moment,
in which the nature, the importance, and the effects of our alliance with the British Empire have become
clearly defined, the people of even the most obscure villages, to whom we have spoken, demonstrate an
understanding of the role which our country will play" (O Mundo, 11.10.1916).
10
 "Diplomacy entrusted its heralds with the task of explaining matters to those who were to be sacrificed and
to their families, through the press, through rallies, and through conferences. In this manner the future
soldiers of Sur-la-Lys were shouted at, until the shouts reached the bottom of their ears, that it was
necessary to D..I..E for Reason! D..I..E for Law! For the small nationalities! And the future soldiers of
Flanders, from that sometimes idiotic, and almost always violent harangue, understood only that, for a great
number of incomprehensible reasons, they were surely going to D..I..E" (João Ferreira do Amaral 1922:
128).
11
 "Stirred by a living faith, the new missionaries of patriotic Glory and Honour held meetings in about eighty
rural municipalities of North Portugal, resulting in the formation of organized groups in these places which,
however, on account of local conditions, did not attain the success of the Central Organization" (Junta
Patriótica do Norte 1918: xviii).
12
 (Osório 1918: 39-40). This picture of American women was contrasted with Osório's view of Portuguese
women: "Scared by the critical atmosphere, terrorized by the prospect of struggle, within their own family,
which greets their first words born out of a consciousness of individuality, paralyzed by an ill-will which
readily greets all acts and words that denote the aspiration to independence, interpreted as the harbingers
of competition [...]" (Osório 1918: 110-11).
13
 "Where everybody speaks the same language—our language—has the same traditions, and laughs or cries
with the same feelings. You must remember this: the man with whom a Portuguese will get along best is
another Portuguese" (Cortesão 1916: 8).
14
 Junqueiro (1916, 1918); Casimiro (1916, 1918); Lima (1917).
15
 (Cortesāo 1919: 105). See also A Capital, which from 23.11.1917 began to speculate on the coming political
crisis and the possibilities of the formation of a new cabinet.
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16
 For a discussion of this counter-mobilization, see chapters VIII and IX of my doctoral dissertation for
Trinity College Dublin, The Failure of the Portuguese First Republic: An Analysis of Wartime Political
Mobilization (1996).
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